November 6, 2018

     The War To End All Deceptions: The Marxist Co-Option Of Western Civilization Self-Identifies By Staging An Obviously Contrived Conflict

The refusal of the World War I Allied nations of Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, France, Canada and the United States to overthrow the Bolshevik regime immediately after the 7 November 1917 coup in Petrograd1 shun a bright spotlight on not only the Marxist co-option of the Allies’ political establishments,2 but Marxist co-option of the Central Powers’ political establishments as well, since after the war those nations that constituted the Central Powers during the war failed after the war to alert the attention of the world to the Allies’ Marxist co-option, where the Allies protected the Bolshevik regime in Petrograd, even though Lenin's war policy would remove Russia from the war, thereby strengthening the Central Powers against the Allies.

The World War I Allies failure to mount a naval expeditionary force to overthrow the weak Bolsheviks in Petrograd and bring Russia back into the war, the Allies' war strategy for victory dependent on Russia's continued presence in the war, casts a glaring spotlight on the Marxist co-option of the West's political establishments. In fact, there was a 60,000 man anti-Bolshevik force already in Russia (located outside Kiev) that on its own could have destroyed the Bolsheviks in Petrograd - the Czechoslovak Legion - but instead of sending the formidable legion 700 miles north to Petrograd, the Allies instead sent it on a 6,000 mile odyssey across Russia to Vladivostok for evacuation back to Europe!

That being said, what does the Russian Army leadership (which is still headed by supposedly Russian Orthodox officers) do when it's ordered to demobilize on November 23? The leadership obeys the Bolshevik order! In fact, between November 7 - 22, the Russian Army leadership did nothing to overturn the Bolshevik coup, even though Kerensky ordered them to!

World War I is an obvious contrived war, where both sides for five years make monumental basic military errors. The race to the North Sea coast is one of the hilarious and obviously staged spectacles of World War I, where we see both sides intentionally prolonging the war. For the Allies, the obvious solution at the beginning of the war for a quick victory is to not follow the German lines, but to outflank and destroy the Germans, and since it was the Germans who had to move men and arms into France, the Germans were always at a strategic disadvantage being so far away from their source of combatants, armaments and other supplies.

It would fall to an Indian Army unit to be the first to breach German lines on the Western Front, accomplished due to the loss of the Indian unit’s British officers, leaving only Indian sepoys to take control of the situation, and since the sepoys didn’t speak English there was no way to communicate a retreat. Major Charles Chenevix Trench, of the Indian Army (1935-1946), inadvertently recounts the Allies' military sabotage: 

“The Indian Corps attacked it [village of Neuve Chapelle] on 10 March [1915]. It was the first recital of a story which was to become familiar: an artillery preparation, puny by later standards, which neither cut the wire properly nor destroyed the machine-guns; the enemy front line overrun, but the second wave of the attack inexplicably delayed for hours; then well organized counter-attacks…
His 2/3rd Gurkhas carried the village and first-line trenches, took three hundred prisoners and dug in. But the Garhwalis lost direction, inclined too much to the right, and came up against a belt of wire in which they tore gaps with bare hands. Eventually, having lost all their British Officers, they took about two hundred yards of enemy trench, but were separated from the rest of the brigade.
It was the first time on the Western Front that the German line was broken. But the follow-up was a problem never solved. It was largely a matter of communications: telephone cable wire cut, runners shot and carrier pigeons unreliable. The Garhwali Brigade was in Neuve Chapelle by 9.30 a.m., but the Dehra Dun Brigade in support did not come forward until 4.00 p.m., and by that time the impetus of the attack was lost. They crossed the Des Layes stream, but had barely made contact with the enemy when they were withdrawn behind it.”3

Unreliable pigeons? How does a homing pigeon become unreliable? Cut telephone cable? How did Germans get behind the Allied unit to cut the cable? Runners shot? By whom? Germans behind the Allied unit? How did they get there? And why would a support unit wait for even thirty minutes to advance once the initial unit has disappeared from view? Obviously the initial unit would be known to be holding its ground and in need of assistance, since otherwise a rout would have long earlier had sepoy combatants returning back to their trenches. But this comedic spectacle of Allied imbecility isn’t a mere one-case occurrence at Neuve Chapelle. As Major Trench observes, the Allies refused to learn from their gross errors for the duration of the war, proving that the purpose for the war was to weaken Western Civilization. Alarmed by the easy rout of German defenses by Indian sepoys, for this indiscretion the Allies in October removed the Indian Infantry Corps from the European theater, sending the Corps to Egypt.

Returning to the Bolsheviks in Petrograd, we are left to ponder the following questions:

(1) How did the Bolshevik Central Committee know that the Allies wouldn't send a naval expeditionary force to overthrow the Bolsheviks in Petrograd, thereby returning Russia to the war?

(2) How did the Bolshevik Central Committee know that the Allies would send the Czechoslovak Legion 6,000 miles across Russia to Vladivostok instead of sending the legion 700 miles north to Petrograd to topple the Bolshevik coup?

(3) How did the Bolshevik Central Committee know that the leadership of the Russian Army - which was still entirely made up of aristocratic, Russian Orthodox, officers - would (i) obey Bolshevik orders; (ii) not obey the order of their Commander-in-Chief- Alexander Kerensky - to topple the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd; and (iii) obey Trotsky's order to demobilize the Russian Army?
The Bolshevik coup in Petrograd would never have taken place unless the Bolshevik Central Committee was assured those three questions were taken care of.
World War I was a Marxist operation creating false oppositions for the purpose of causing chaos, where out of the ashes of chaos the Marxist global position would be stronger. The official term Marxists give to this false opposition tactic is the Scissors Strategy,4 in which the blades represent the two falsely opposed sides that converge on the confused victims, simultaneously neutralizing true opposition while advancing the Marxist agenda.
As soon as the World War I operation had ended, Marxists began planing for the World War II operation with the creation of that war's two false opposition fronts, the National Socialist German Workers' Party and the National Fascist Party in Italy. Benito Mussolini was a well known and influential Marxist before the Comintern ordered that he take up a new identity as leader of the National Fascist Party. As for Adolf Hitler's Marxist pedigree, one-third of Hitler's SA and Gestapo personnel were 'former' Marxists:
“Adolf Hitler himself was the first to admit that National Socialism and Communism had much in common. ‘There is more that binds us to Bolshevism than separates us from it,’ he once said in a revealing conversation, ‘There is, above all, revolutionary feeling…I have always made allowances for this circumstance, and given orders that former Communists are to be admitted to the party at once. The petit bourgeois Social Democrat and the trade-union boss will never be a National Socialist, but the Communist always will.’ Hitler, in this case at least, was true to his word. After he seized power, he saw to it that thousands of Communists were enrolled in the NSDAP. They were particularly effective in the Gestapo and in the SA, where they formed perhaps a third of the total membership. Indeed, there were so many of them that they were given a special name. They were known popularly as the “Beefsteak Nazi” – Brown on the outside, Red on the inside."5

During the course of World War II Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Chief of the Abwehr  (German military intelligence), and General Reinhard Gehlen, Chief of the German General Staff’s intelligence unit for the Soviet Union and East European countries,Foreign Armies East  (FHO), independently discovered that a group supervised by Deputy Führer Martin Bormann,6 second in command of Germany, was transmitting unsupervised coded radio messages to Moscow:

"Our suspicions were largely confirmed when, independently of one another, we found out that Bormann and his group were operating an unsupervised radio transmitter network and using it to send coded messages to Moscow. When OKW monitors reported this, Canaris demanded an investigation; but word came back that Hitler himself had emphatically forbidden any intervention: he had been informed in advance by Bormann of these Funkspiele, or fake radio messages, he said, and he had approved them."7
The only way to ensure that fake radio messages were being sent to Moscow, and not the latest Wehrmacht movements in the Eastern theater of operations, is to have such radio messages supervised by intelligence officers vetted for counterintelligence operations. It's one thing for Hitler to approve fake radio messages, but there's no excuse to not have the fake radio messages supervised by experienced counterintelligence officers. To refuse to implement this critical standard operating supervisory procedure cries out treason, since even Bormann himself should have wanted to ensure none of his subordinates were transmitting sensitive information to Moscow. The fact that Hitler refused such elementary precautions informs us that Hitler & Company were Marxist agents, sabotaging the German war effort from Berlin. In fact, it was the winter of 1941-42 that Gehlen and fellow generals had assessed that the Soviet campaign was a hopeless enterprise "…not because it could not be militarily or politically won, but because of Hitler's continued interference, which resulted in such elementary blunders that defeat was inevitable."
Hitler allowed Marxists to infiltrate the National Socialist German Workers' Party and its militarized entities, yet he refused to ensure that Bormann's subordinates weren't transmitting Wehrmacht movements to Moscow!
Gehlen details Hitler’s sabotage of Germany's Soviet campaign:
(1) The General Staff wanted to concentrate resources on capturing Moscow, since Moscow was the Command & Control location for Soviet forces. Hitler insisted on dissipating the effort on three fronts.
(2) The General Staff saw that the Soviets were going to entrap the Sixth Army at Stalingrad, and demanded a strategic withdrawal. Hitler vetoed this and 200,000 of Germany's best troops were lost, including the loss of irreplaceable weaponry.
(3) To replace these losses, the General Staff wanted to recruit millions of willing volunteers from anti-Communist ranks, i.e. Russians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians etc.:
“After twenty years of arbitrary injustice and terror, the reestablishment of elementary human rights such as the dignity of man, liberty, justice, and the sanctity of property united every inhabitant of the Soviet empire (insofar as he was not directly working for the Moscow system) in a common readiness to support the Germans. What could be more natural for us than to exploit this readiness?"9 
Hitler’s policy of treating Slavs as sub-human sabotaged any meaningful attempt in turning captured Soviet soldiers into German allies.

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1A. In one of the many senseless campaigns fought on the Western Front, the Cambrai campaign (20 November 1917 - 7 December 1917) witnessed more than 44,000 casualties, including 7,000 servicemen of the United Kingdom and South Africa dying for little ground gained. That 44,000 casualty figure should have been used instead for the more critical campaign against the Bolsheviks in Petrograd, resulting in the re-entry of Russia into the war, thereby sparing the exhausted Allies the prospect of facing (1) thirty German divisions previously deployed against Russia on the Eastern Front;* (2) Austro-Hungarian divisions freed from the Russian Western Front (twenty-three Austro-Hungarian divisions); and (3) Ottoman divisions freed from the Caucasus Campaign. In fact, a 60,000 strong Allied military unit was already in Russia (the Ukraine) at the time--the Czechoslovak Legion--and could have been used to overthrow the Bolsheviks if the Allied powers so wished. Instead, the Czechoslovak Legion was sent on a 6,000 mile odyssey across Russia, its destination Vladivostok on the Pacific coast for passage back to Europe and the war, instead of sending the legion 700 miles due north to Petrograd and collapse the Bolshevik coup. The Allied political establishments were doing all they could to (1) protect the fledgling Bolshevik regime in Petrograd; while (2) sabotaging every opportunity to immediately get Russia back into the war before the Bolshevik position had strengthened throughout Russia. Only when the position of the Bolsheviks was relatively secure would the Allied powers mount campaigns to supposedly overthrow the Bolsheviks (North Russia Intervention and Siberian Intervention), campaigns that were sure to fail due to the lackluster number of soldiers assigned to both missions (though the Japanese contingent of 70,000 soldiers deployed to the Siberian Intervention is a minimum number one would expect from the combined American, British and French contingent, whose actual total complement registered an anemic 10,250 soldiers up against 600,000 Bolsheviks) and the remote locations for the soldiers' landings--Archangel (British, French, Italian and American), Murmansk (British, French, Italian and American) and Vladivostok (American, British, French, Canadian, Italian, Polish, Chinese and Japanese)--far from the Bolshevik's Command and Control center located in Petrograd (Saint Petersburg), where too the Bolshevik's leadership (Central Committee) is located.

*The Allies would also have to worry about the eventual redeployment to the Western Front of the eleven divisions that made up the German 9th Army, at the time engaged in the Romanian Campaign; with Russia out of the war, Romania was surrounded and wouldn't be able to remain in the war for long. As it turned out, on December 9, 1917 Romania signed an armistice with the Central Powers, freeing the German 9th Army's eleven divisions for action on the Western Front.

1B. Even more telling is neutral Denmark's laying mines off its coastal waters in international waterways in August [1914] at the prompting of Germany, and Great Britain and Imperial Russia conspire to not deploy their minesweepers to the Danish straits! Not a word from the Allies (and the usual deafening silence from the Marxist co-opted press), in fact, even though access to the Baltic Sea is critical for the Allies to roll up Germany quickly by (a) closing the Baltic Sea to all German surface/subsurface vessels; (b) denying German access to trade with Sweden; (c) bringing the Royal Navy and the Imperial Russian Navy together; (d) forcing Germany to relocate critically needed infantry divisions and heavy armaments away from the Western Front for the new Baltic Front; and (e) allowing for a Petrograd originating joint Anglo-Russo expeditionary landing along Germany's Baltic coast, to become operational three days after a general offensive on the Western Front; with the Baltic coast calm for three days, the German General Staff will be in the process of moving infantry divisions and heavy guns to bolster the Western Front. When the German relief is midway in transit, that's when the Anglo-Russo naval expedition hits a weakened German Baltic coast.

The following is a communique sent from the Danish foreign minister to German and English envoys, informing them of Denmark's intention to close the Danish straits:

"In order to enforce neutrality and keep military operations away from Danish waterways and coasts and to secure continued connection between the various parts of the country, the Danish government has decided to close Danish territorial waterways in the Sound as well as the Great and Little Belts by mining."

Notice that the Danish foreign minister refers to Danish territorial waterways to be closed, when in fact the laying of mines includes international waterways (as noted in the maps; click first map for perspective); red indicating the positions of the Danish mines in the Sound and Bay of Koege. In fact Germany too lays its mines in the Danish straits - signified by the green lines  -  leaving Great Britain conspicuously absent from the game.). So what was the law of the sea regarding the laying of mines in 1914:

"...the 1907 Hague Convention III contains no specific provision that prohibits or considerably restricts the laying of mines in certain sea areas."

Here we have another Allied coordinated strategy to assist the Central Powers, thereby conflating what would have been an easy Allied knockout of Germany from the war, necessitating the bowing out of the remainder of the Central Powers' nations: Since the international waterways of the Danish straits are mined by both the Danish and German navies, then the Royal Navy very well can't send an expeditionary naval force to overthrow Lenin & Bolsheviks in Petrograd, can it? As a matter of fact the Royal Navy still could have sent a naval expeditionary force to Petrograd by deploying a few of the dozens of modern mine sweepers it had on hand.

Then again, there really wasn't a pressing need for the Royal Navy's presence in Petrograd, because 100,000 Czech Legion soldiers were already on the ground in the Ukraine, and could itself have easily taken out the Bolsheviks first in Moscow, then in Petrograd. Of course, it would be nice for the Royal Navy and its cargo of soldiers to hook up with the Czech Legion when the legion made it to Petrograd. The meeting of the two Allied military formations would have been a grande opportunity for film and pictures.

With the Baltic Sea a private watering hole for British and Russian navies, German naval vessels being penned in port by Allied mines, submarines and destroyer-torpedo boats, German Army movement eastwards along the Baltic coast would have been stymied by older and modern battleships of both the British and Russian navies, laying down withering fields of fire along the Baltic coast, allowing a clear path for the Russian Army westwards, one section of the Russian Army hitting German forces head-on, while the second Russian section flanks those German units further east. As such, Germany would have been stymied from even considering entering the war, and if Germany was so foolhardy to enter the war, her involvement would have been short lived, consigning the remainder of the Central Powers to negotiate terms with the Allies.

2. The failed socialist inspired and controlled pan-European revolutions that swept the continent in 1848 taught Marxists and socialists a powerful lesson, that lesson being they couldn't win overtly, so they adopted the tactic of infiltration of the West's political parties/institutions. In the case of the United States...(continue reading)…

Upon the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd on November 7, 1917, the Russian Army inexplicably allowed for its dissolution by the Bolshevik authorities(!) rather than easily destroy the Bolsheviks, proving (1) the Provisional government was a Bolshevik front playing the 'Scissors Strategy'; and (2) the Imperial Russian Army's officer corps was fatally infiltrated by Marxists. The disaster of Russia's defection from the war was also greeted with silent jubilation by the Marxist co-opted Western press, co-option proven by the Western press' failure to direct its readers' understanding to the critical immediate need of an Allied intervention to bring Russia back into the war, starting with sending the Czechoslovak Legion due north to overthrow the Bolsheviks in Petrograd.

Feigning ignorance of the implications, Brian D. Taylor (associate professor of political science in the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University) notices the odd reluctance of the Russian Army to reinstall the Kerensky government, and its refusal to overthrow the Bolsheviks once demobilization of the army itself became known:

"The military leadership was again faced with a major political decision when the Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917. The military high command, with one significant exception, did initially follow Kerensky’s orders to move troops to Petrograd to quash the Bolshevik uprising . However, once it became clear that the Provisional Government had collapsed, the military made no serious efforts to resist the Bolshevik take-over in Petrograd or at the military headquarters a month later.
…
When examined in depth, however, the most striking thing about these cases is how passive  the military was in the face of obvious threats to its fundamental interests. Even the Kornilov affair, coded as a case of military intervention, came about only after, through the bizarre series of circumstances, the Prime Minister reneged on his commitments to the military leadership, and accused its top general of treason."

Kerensky's and the Russian army leadership's blatant sabotage in failing to restore the Provisional Government identifies both actors as Bolshevik agents following the classic Marxist tactic called the Scissors Strategy.

3. The Indian Army and the King’s Enemies, 1900-1947, by Charles Chenevix Trench (Thames and Hudson: New York, New York, 1988), p. 41.

4. New Lies for Old, by KGB defector Major Anatoliy Golitsyn, (1984).

5. Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany 1918-1923, by Robert G.L. Waite, (1969), pp 273-274.

6. Martin Bormann's correct title should be Party Chancellery  and not Deputy Führer, the Office of Deputy Führer becoming defunct on May 12, 1941, two days after Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess flew to Scotland. I use Deputy Führer because it better exemplifies the power Bormann wielded.

7. The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen, by General Reinhard Gehlen (1972), pp. 70-71.